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Abstract 
 
We investigated whether boundary restriction—misremembering proximity to traumatic 
stimuli—is a form of memory amplification, and whether re-experiencing trauma plays a role 
in boundary restriction errors. In four experiments, subjects viewed a series of traumatic 
photographs. Later, subjects identified the photographs they originally saw amongst 
distracters that could be identical, close-up or wide-angled versions of the same photographs. 
Subjects also completed measures of mood, analogue PTSD symptoms, phenomenological 
experience of intrusions and processing style. Across experiments, subjects were more likely 
to incorrectly remember the photographs as having extended boundaries: boundary 
extension. Despite this tendency, the extent to which subjects re-experienced traumatic 
aspects of the photographs predicted how often they incorrectly remembered the photographs 
as having narrower boundaries: boundary restriction. Our data suggest that although 
boundary extension is more common, boundary restriction is related to individual differences 
in coping mechanisms post-trauma. These results have theoretical implications for 
understanding how people remember trauma.  
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Boundary restriction for negative emotional images is an example of memory 
amplification. 
People often have vivid, graphic memories of traumatic events (Levine & Edelstein, 
2009). Sometimes, those memories are focused closely on one aspect of the event: when a 
weapon is present at a crime, witnesses often have difficulty remembering any other 
details (e.g., Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2013). Indeed, people are more likely to 
remember emotionally salient or central, compared to peripheral, details about negatively 
arousing events (e.g., Christianson & Loftus 1987; Safer, Christianson, Autry, & 
Osterland, 1998; Waring, Payne, Schacter, and Kensinger, 2010). Importantly, this 
pattern of amplified memory for salient details extends to memory distortion. Both field 
and lab data show that people often claim to remember salient parts of a traumatic 
experience that were not previously reported, or known to be not experienced, and 
further, that such distortions are often associated with poor adjustment (e.g., Giosan, 
Malta, Jayasinghe, Spielman, & Difede, 2009; Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, Ehlich, & 
Friedman, 1998; Strange & Takarangi, 2012, 2014). We wondered whether memory 
amplification might also manifest as misremembering “proximity” to traumatic stimuli: 
some data suggest people remember negative images as having narrower boundaries than 
they actually had, a phenomenon called boundary restriction. Our aim in these 
experiments was twofold: to provide further evidence of boundary restriction as a form of 
memory amplification, and to investigate whether re-experiencing aspects of the 
trauma—via involuntary intrusions—is related to memory distortion—via boundary 
restriction—for a traumatic experience. 
We know people are susceptible to memory distortion for traumatic events. In one line 
of research, victims of trauma often claim to have experienced a greater number of 
traumatic events over time (Bolton, Gray, & Litz, 2006; Engelhard, van den Hout, & 
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McNally, 2008; Giosan et al., 2009; King et al., 2000; Koenen, Stellman, 
Dohrenwend, Sommer, & Stellman, 2007; Krinsley, Gallagher, Weathers, Kutter, & 
Kaloupek, 2003; Roemer et al., 1998; Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, & Charney, 
1997; Wessely et al., 2003; Wyshak, 1994). For example, Southwick et al. (1997) asked 
Gulf War veterans about exposure to war related stressors during their service (e.g., 
experiencing sniper fire) at one month and two years post-deployment. Veterans’ reports 
were inconsistent: 88% changed their response to at least one event and the majority of 
changes were from non-endorsements to endorsements. This pattern of memory 
distortion is termed memory “amplification.” Importantly, the more severe the victim’s 
PTSD symptoms, the more likely they exhibit amplification (Engelhard et al., 2008; 
Giosan et al., 2009; King et al., 2000; Koenen et al., 2007; Roemer et al., 1998; 
Southwick et al., 1997). This amplification effect appears to be exclusively associated 
with the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD (Giosan et al., 2009; Koenen et al., 2007; 
Roemer et al., 1998). 
In a second line of research, Strange and Takarangi (2012) demonstrated memory 
distortion for analogue trauma under controlled experimental conditions. Subjects 
watched a film showing a multiple-fatality car accident. The film appeared as short clips 
separated by blank screens, with some traumatic and non-traumatic scenes missing. 
Twenty-four hours later, subjects completed a surprise recognition test comprised of old 
and missing clips as well as new (control) clips. Subjects judged whether each clip was 
old (from the film) or new (not from the film). Although subjects most often correctly 
identified old and control clips, they also claimed to have seen 26% of the missing clips. 
Most often, those missing scenes were traumatic (e.g., a child screaming for her parents). 
Interestingly, the more subjects reported re-experiencing parts of the film in the 24-hour 
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delay period, the greater their propensity to falsely recognize the traumatic missing clips, 
or, to amplify their memory.  
Collectively, these data fit with Rubin, Berntsen and Bohni’s (2008) memory-based 
model of PTSD, which argues that a person’s current memory of a traumatic event—not 
the traumatic event per se—determines symptomatology. To date, however, amplification 
has been operationalized exclusively as endorsing additional aspects of trauma, or parts of 
a traumatic experience known to be not experienced. We wondered whether there are 
other ways in which this memory distortion might manifest itself. 
One possibility is that misremembering proximity—falsely remembering being 
closer—to a traumatic event is a form of memory amplification. For example, a subset of 
witnesses to a school shooting misremembered their location during the shooting when 
asked about it months later (Schwarz, Kowlaski & McNally, 1993). In another study, 
subjects were most likely to recall being closer to enemy lines—changing their responses 
from ”no” to ”yes”—and here this change was related to PTSD symptomology 
(Southwick et al., 1997). Although the relationship between proximity to trauma and 
symptoms has not been examined systematically, the literature on memory for visual 
scenes provides a potential method.  
We know people often falsely remember seeing details beyond the boundaries of a 
visual scene: boundary extension. In one study, subjects saw a picture of a teddy bear on a 
single step and later drew the bear sitting on a flight of stairs; extending their memory of 
the scene (Intraub, Gottesman, Willey & Zuk, 1996). This effect has replicated across 
materials (drawings, photographs, recognition tests, and judgments of camera distance; 
e.g., Intraub, & Bodamer, 1993; Intraub, Daniels, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2008; Intraub et 
al., 1996) and fMRI data suggest the effect occurs because people tend to imagine beyond 
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the boundaries of a scene. In two studies, patients with profound hippocampal damage—
who tend to have trouble imagining themselves in the future, or visualising an imaginary 
scene—did not display boundary extension (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 
2007; Mullally, Hassabis, and Maguire, 2012).  
Interestingly, however, after viewing emotional pictures, people often recall that the 
pictures had narrower boundaries: boundary restriction. In one example, subjects saw a 
series of slides depicting either a traumatic or neutral version of the same event (e.g., an 
injured woman lying on the grass vs. the same woman crouching on the grass, picking a 
flower; Safer et al., 1998). Later, subjects viewed original slides amongst distracters that 
depicted wider angled and close-up versions of the slides. They rated whether the 
perspective was closer, the same distance or further away than the original. When 
subjects saw the neutral event, they were more likely to make boundary extension errors. 
Yet, when they saw the traumatic event, subjects were more likely to make boundary 
restriction errors. These results echo those of autobiographical memory narrowing where 
positive affect enhances recall of peripheral details, while negative affect impairs it (e.g., 
Bernsten, 2002; Talarico et al., 2009). Although subsequent attempts to demonstrate 
boundary restriction have produced mixed results—likely due to distinct methodological 
differences across studies (Candel, Merckelbach, & Zandbergen, 2003; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2004)—these studies do provide some evidence that misremembering 
proximity to a traumatic image may be another example of memory amplification. Might 
boundary restriction, then, also be related to psychological symptoms? 
One explanation for the relationship between amplified memory and greater re-
experiencing symptoms is a failure in source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993: Lindsay, 2008). For example, intrusive re-experiencing may stimulate the 
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production of other imagined thoughts or images relating to the event that may, over time, 
be mistaken for genuine memory traces. This imagination of new traumatic material 
might result in a person misremembering a traumatic event as being more personally 
threatening than it actually was. Indeed, Mathews and Mackintosh (2004) found that 
boundary restriction was stronger among subjects with high compared to low trait 
anxiety, which fits with data showing that high-anxiety people tend to focus on and 
engage with the threatening component of materials (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, and van IJzendoorn, 2007). These ideas also fit with 
Fredrickson’s (1998; 2001; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) broaden-and-build theory of 
positive emotions, which argues that positive emotions broaden an individual’s attention 
to peripheral features and their thought-action repertoire. The theory also posits that 
aspects of an emotional event that help identify and perpetuate the emotion provoked by 
the experience will be enhanced relative to the other aspects of the event. Hence, negative 
emotions would narrow attention to the threatening components. 
We suspect that misremembering the threat associated with negative images may lead 
a person to infer they were closer to the event than they actually were and, thus, later 
overestimate their proximity to the traumatic event. To test this idea, we used an analogue 
trauma design. Subjects viewed traumatic still photos taken from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). A series of 
questionnaires allowed us to measure changes in mood and analogue trauma symptoms in 
relation to the photographs. We tested subjects’ memory for the photographs after a brief 
delay, manipulating whether subjects saw the same photographs or photographs that were 
wider-angled or close-up versions of the originals. In the context of this series of studies, 
overestimating proximity would be reflected in a bias to select close-up photographs or 
remembering the boundaries of a photo as being more restricted than what they actually 
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were. In particular, we predicted that people with re-experiencing symptoms would be 
especially prone to boundary restriction errors.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects.   
We recruited 157 subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We excluded data from 13 
people who failed to accurately complete the instructional manipulation checks embedded 
within the study (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, 2009), 29 who did not 
conform to our procedure1, and seven who reported they had technical issues resulting in 
them not seeing one or more photographs at encoding or during the test. Thus, our 
analyses focus on the remaining 113 subjects; all were US residents. We did not collect 
any demographic or socioeconomic information.  
Materials 
Traumatic stimuli. We selected fifty photographs from the IAPS and divided them into 
two sets (A and B) of 25 photographs, matched for valence (MSet A= 1.87 [95% CI: 1.77, 
1.96], MSet B= 1.86 [1.76, 1.96], t<1), and arousal (MSet A= 6.28 [6.06, 6.50], MSet B= 6.32 
[6.11, 6.54], t<1). We selected photographs with standardized ratings of negative valence 
(<2.5 on a scale where 1=low pleasure and 9=high pleasure) where it was also possible to 
crop the photograph so that the central objects were magnified but entire objects or people 
were not removed.   
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
We assessed subjects’ mood before and after viewing the photographs using the 20-item !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1)People spent either too little or too much time overall viewing the photographs at encoding 
(based on page timing data), suggesting that they could have paused, skipped or replayed the 
encoding video.  
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version of the PANAS. Subjects rated their current feelings according to 10 positive (e.g., 
“enthusiastic”) and 10 negative (e.g., “nervous”) adjectives. The scales have been shown 
to have excellent convergent correlations with other more extensive measures of mood 
(.76 to .92) (Watson et al., 1988). In addition, both the negative affect (NA) and positive 
affect (PA) subscales correlate with other measures of distress and psychopathology, 
including the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; negative affect: r = .56; positive 
affect: r=-.29) and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; negative affect: r = .74; positive 
affect: r = -.36).  
  PTSD Checklist Revised (PCL-R). We created a modified2 version of the PCL 
(Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska & Keane, 1993) to assess subjects’ analogue trauma 
symptoms in relation to their exposure to the traumatic photographs. Subjects rated the 
extent to which they had been bothered by 14 symptoms (e.g., “Repeated, disturbing 
memories, thoughts, or images…”) in relation to the photographs (1=not at all, 2=a little 
bit, 3=moderately, 4=quite a bit, 5=extremely). Thus, possible scores ranged from 14-70 
with higher scores indicating more distress relating to the photographs. The PCL has been 
shown to have excellent convergent validity, correlating highly with the Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) (r = .93) (Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & 
Forneris, 1996).  
Procedure  
This research was approved by the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics 
Committee at Flinders University and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the 
World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. We administered the study as an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 We omitted 3 items that could not be sensibly rated in relation to the photographs given the 
timeframe between the encoding and test phases:  “repeated, disturbing dreams...”, “loss of 
interest in things that you used to enjoy” and “trouble falling or staying asleep” 
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online survey using Qualtrics software. We told subjects the study was about juror 
decision-making and would allow us to evaluate the impact of different types of graphic 
visual evidence on mock juror decision-making; particularly whether graphic material 
exacerbates the difficulty for jurors in remaining objective and attending to their task. 
After indicating their consent to take part, subjects completed the PANAS.  
Encoding Phase. We next presented subjects with 25 close-up and 25 wide-angled 
photographs (counterbalanced across Sets A and Set B)3. Close-up photographs were 
edited to 50% of their original size and appeared for 5s each, separated by a 1s black 
screen, in a video format created using iMovie. We counterbalanced the order of the 
photographs, using two versions to control for order effects. After viewing the 
photographs, we asked subjects to complete the PANAS again, then rate—on an 7-point 
Likert-type scale (1=not at all, 7=extremely) (a) how unpleasant they found the 
photographs, (b) how distressed they felt after viewing the photographs, and (c) how 
closely they paid attention to the photographs. We next asked subjects to work on 
unrelated puzzles for 20 minutes, after which time the survey allowed them to proceed to 
the next study phase.  
Test Phase. We first administered the PCL, followed by the recognition test. The test 
was a 2 alternative forced choice (2AFC) procedure; subjects saw both the close-up and 
wide-angled versions of all 50 photographs, and indicated which photograph they had 
seen during the encoding phase, and how confident they were in their decision (1=not at 
all, 5=extremely). 
At the conclusion of the online survey, subjects were thanked and debriefed.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Due to a technical error in the photograph editing, some subjects saw one or two moving 
images at encoding. Because movement could be confused with proximity, we removed the 
memory data relating to these photographs.  
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Results 
Emotional impact of photos 
We first examined subjects’ mood change and ratings of the photographs after 
exposure. Subjects experienced a decrease in positive mood (Time 1: M=29.49, 95% CI 
[27.85, 31.13]; Time 2: M=23.07 [21.49, 24.66]; t(112)=11.02, p<.01, d=.74 [.58, .90]) 
and an increase in negative mood (Time 1: M=12.40, 95% CI [11.63, 13.17]; Time 2: 
M=20.81 [19.20, 22.41]; t(112)=11.47, p<.01, d=1.25 [.98, 1.51]) after viewing the 
photographs. They rated the photos as being very unpleasant (M=6.12, SD=1.53), and 
distressing (M=5.12, SD=1.67). Subjects’ scores on the modified PCL ranged from the 
scale minimum of 14, to 55 (M=24.08, SD=10.11). Cronbach’s Alpha for the modified 
PCL was high (.91). In analyses using the PCL, we used a log-transformation to correct 
for positive skew in the distribution of scores. Subjects reported that they had paid close 
attention to the photographs: M=6.50 (SD=.70), Range 3-7. 
Memory accuracy 
We next examined subjects’ accuracy at recognizing the photographs using a signal 
detection approach. This approach is advantageous because it allows us to separate 
subjects’ ability to discriminate between old and new photos at test (d’)—which depends 
on the strength of a memory trace—from the response criterion (c), a measure that 
reflects a subject’s tendency to boundary extend or boundary restrict at test. We 
arbitrarily classified wider-angled photos as signal events and close-up photographs as 
noise events. Thus, for example, correctly choosing a wider-angled photograph was 
coded as a hit, and incorrectly choosing a wider-angled photograph was classified as a 
false alarm. We calculated signal detection measures d’ and c, where d’ denotes the 
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ability to correctly remember the viewing angle, c < 0 is a response bias toward selecting 
wider-angled photographs, and c > 0 is a bias toward selecting close-up photographs.  
Our d’ data indicate low sensitivity (M=1.08, 95% CI [.96, 1.21]) among our subjects, 
suggesting they had difficulty discriminating between the wide-angled and close-up 
versions of the photographs. Put another way, subjects were fairly inaccurate at 
identifying the photograph they saw originally. Indeed, this d' corresponds to an accuracy 
level of approximately 69%, assuming unbiased responding. However, our c data suggest 
a reasonably strong bias towards selecting wide-angled photographs (M=-.45 [-.38, -.52]); 
in other words, subjects were most likely to make boundary extension errors.  
Analogue PTSD symptoms and memory accuracy 
Recall that we were particularly interested in the relationship between memory errors 
and analogue symptoms. However, before examining subjects’ reactions to the 
photographs, we first examined the potential influence of pre-existing individual 
differences in negative affect and dysphoria. Correlating d’ and c with subjects’ baseline 
scores on the PANAS showed that people with heightened negative affect did not have 
poorer memory (rNA=-.15, p=.12). The other effects surrounded zero (rs -.03 to -.05). We 
next correlated d’ with subjects’ scores on the PCL. This analysis revealed that the more 
symptoms people experienced in relation to the photographs, the poorer their memory 
discriminability, r= -.19, p=.04, 95% CI [-.37, -.01]. That is, the more analogue trauma 
symptoms subjects reported, the greater their inability to correctly remember their 
proximity to the photo they were shown during encoding. Of course, we were most 
interested in whether people who experienced more adverse analogue symptoms in 
relation to the photographs would show a greater bias towards selecting close-up 
photographs (making boundary restriction errors). To test this hypothesis, we correlated c 
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with total PCL scores. This analysis revealed that people who reported more symptoms 
were not more likely to select close-up photos (i.e., to make boundary restriction errors): 
r=.17, p=.07, 95% CI [-.02, .34].  
We also hypothesised that re-experiencing symptoms in particular would be most 
likely to predict memory errors. To investigate this prediction, we broke down the PCL 
into four subscales: re-experiencing, avoidance, numbness and hyperarousal. Table 1 
presents the correlation between subscale scores and d’ and c scores. The more overall 
symptoms—and numbness symptoms—that people experienced, the poorer their memory 
(d’). Of relevance to our hypothesis, more re-experiencing symptoms—and also more 
avoidance symptoms—were associated with a tendency to select close-up photos (c), and 
thus to make BREs. 
Confidence 
Finally, we were interested in whether subjects had a different phenomenological 
experience at test for the two different types of errors. To this end, we calculated mean 
confidence classified by incorrect and correct responses, and whether photographs were 
wide-angled or close-up at encoding. A 2 x 2 within-subjects ANOVA revealed that 
subjects were more confident in correct answers (M=3.83 [3.71, 3.96]) compared to 
incorrect answers (M=3.36 [3.20, 3.52]), F(1, 106)=102.64, p<.01, η2=.49 [.36, .49]); they 
were also more confident in their responses to photos that were originally presented as 
wide-angled (M=3.69 [3.55, 3.83]), compared to close-up (M=3.51 [3.37, 3.65]), F(1, 
106)=18.53, p<.01, η2=.15 [.05, .27]). When there is potential for subjects to make 
boundary restriction errors, they are more confident in their responses, compared to when 
there is opportunity for subjects to make boundary extension errors. This result makes 
sense given that subjects were far more inclined overall to make boundary extension 
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errors compared to boundary restriction errors.  
In summary then, although re-experiencing and avoidance symptoms were associated 
with boundary restriction errors, the overall rate of BREs was low. In Experiment 2, we 
changed the format of the memory test, in order to increase the rate of BREs. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 163 subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We excluded data from 8 
people who failed to accurately complete the embedded instructional manipulation 
checks, 31 who did not conform to our procedure,4 11 who reported technical issues 
resulting in them not seeing one or more photographs during the encoding or test phases, 
and two who did not pass the practice items. Thus, our analyses focus on the remaining 
112 subjects. These subjects were US residents, aged 19-70 (M= 33.64, SD = 10.31). 
Approximately half (52%) were male and the majority identified their ethnicity as 
Caucasian (including White; 74.77%). Others identified as African American (including 
Black; 9.91%), Hispanic (2.70%), Asian American (2.70%), Caribbean American (.9%), 
Arab (.9%) and mixed ethnic origin (8.12%).  Socioeconomic data were not collected. 
Materials and Procedure 
We used the same materials as in Experiment 1, plus two additional measures. 
Experience of Intrusions Scale (EIS; Salters-Pedneault, Vine, Mills, Park & Litz, 
2009). We used this brief, five-item scale to assess both the frequency of intrusive 
thoughts about the photographs (0=almost never, 1=infrequently, 2=occasionally, 
3=frequently, 4=very frequently), and the phenomenology of those intrusive experiences, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 These subjects spent either too little or too much time viewing the photographs at encoding 
(based on page timing data) or could not correctly report the last image they saw.   
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such as the extent to which they created interference and distress, and were unpredictable 
and unwanted (0=not at all, 1=a little, 2=moderately, 3=quite a bit, 4= extremely). 
Previous psychometric examination revealed good internal consistency values and 
convergent validity with total re-experiencing (Cluster B) scores on the PCL-C, (r = .22) 
(Salters-Pedneault et al. 2009). Our own data revealed a strong Cronbach’s alpha of .90.  
Cognitive Processing Questionnaire, data-driven processing subscale (CPQ-DD; 
Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002). We used this 8-item subscale to assess the extent to 
which subjects processed the perceptual features of the photographs, to indirectly assess 
how much attention subjects paid to these features. Subjects rated the extent to which 
items such as  “My mind was fully occupied with what I saw, heard, smelled, and felt” 
applied to them while they were viewing the photographs, using a 5-point scale (1=not at 
all, 2=a little, 3=moderately, 4=strongly, 5=very strongly). The original CPQ has good 
psychometric properties (Ehlers, 1998), and predictive validity for PTSD, with the Data 
Driven Processing Scale correlating significantly with PTSD (PDS) scores following 
assault, r = .40.  (Halligan et al., 2002). Our own data revealed a strong Cronbach’s alpha 
of .82. 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: (1) 
Subjects completed the CPQ-DD subscale after the second PANAS, and the EIS items 
prior to the PCL. (2) The recognition test used a “camera distance” rating (Intraub et al., 
1992; Safer et al., 1998). We told subjects: “These pictures are similar to the pictures you 
saw earlier in the session, during the video. However, some of these pictures have been 
altered so that the camera is either slightly closer to, or slightly further away from, the 
main object(s) in the picture.” We asked subjects to judge whether the “camera distance" 
of each test picture matched the camera distance of the picture they had seen earlier, using 
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a 5-point scale: -2 (much closer than the original), -1 (slightly closer), 0 (no change), 1 
(slightly farther), 2 (much farther). We explained that a closer camera distance meant 
seeing less background than in the original and a farther distance meant seeing more 
background. We showed subjects example picture pairs illustrating one picture being 
closer, farther away, and the same camera distance. We also had subjects complete 
practice items with unrelated neutral slides and required them to accurately rate two of 
each type (closer, same, farther) to remain in the study. The test included the same 50 
negative photographs that had been presented at encoding, of which half were close-up 
and half were wide-angled (again, we counterbalanced across Sets A and B). However, it 
is important to note that subjects saw all the photographs at the same camera distance on 
the test (i.e., the correct camera distance rating was ‘no change’ for all items). Figure 1 
illustrates the photographs presented at encoding and test, and the correct vs. incorrect 
responses. We also asked subjects to rate how confident they were in their camera 
distance decision (1=not at all confident, 5=extremely confident). At the conclusion of the 
online survey, subjects were thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
Emotional impact of photos 
Again, we first examined subjects’ overall reactions to the photographs. Similar to 
Experiment 1, subjects experienced a decrease in positive mood (Time 1: M=28.72, 95% 
CI [26.97, 30.46]; Time 2: M=22.13 [20.88, 23.38]; t(109)=9.66, p<.01, d=.82 [.62, 
1.02]) and an increase in negative mood (Time 1: M=12.03 [11.37, 12.68]; Time 2: 
M=19.53 [18.12, 20.95]; t(110)=10.90, p<.01, d=1.28 [.99, 1.56]) after viewing the 
photographs. They rated the photos as being very unpleasant (M=6.14 [5.86, 6.41]), and 
distressing (M=5.03 [4.69, 5.37]). Subjects’ scores on the modified PCL were similar to 
those in Experiment 1, ranging from 14-53 (M=23.63 [21.85, 25.42]) with Cronbach’s 
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Alpha = .91. Again, we used a log-transformation to correct for positive skew in the 
distribution of PCL scores. Subjects’ scores on the PCL were positively correlated with 
EIS scores (also log-transformed), r(111)=.68 [.56, .77], p<.01. Again, subjects reported 
that they had paid close attention to the photographs: M=6.39 (SD=.73), Range 5-7. 
Memory accuracy 
On average, subjects rated photographs as much closer (15.84%), slightly closer 
(31.30%), no change (48.79%), slightly farther (3.55%) and much farther (0.52%). Thus, 
in about half of all instances subjects correctly recognised that the photograph was 
unchanged from encoding. However, the mean reported camera distance on the -2 to +2 
scale across all 50 photographs was significantly less than zero (where 0 indicates no 
change), M=-.58 [.52, .64], t(110)=-19.29, p<.01, d=1.83 [1.52, 2.13]. Taken together, 
these data show that subjects again exhibited a tendency toward boundary extension 
errors, incorrectly perceiving that they were seeing less background at test.  Put another 
way, they remembered the boundaries of the original picture as having been greater. We 
were primarily interested in boundary restriction (incorrectly judging the pictures as being 
farther), an error that subjects made infrequently. Indeed, the distribution of errors was 
skewed; hence we used a log transformation on this variable. 
Analogue PTSD symptoms and memory accuracy 
As in Experiment 1, we first examined whether baseline differences in affect 
influenced memory accuracy. There was no relationship between subjects’ baseline 
scores on the PANAS subscales and the proportion of boundary extension errors they 
made (rPA=.03 [-.16, .22], p=.73; rNA=.06 [-.13, .24], p=.50). Neither positive affect (r=-
.01 [-.20, .18], p=.96) nor negative affect was related to making BREs (r=.18 [-.01, .36], 
p=.06).  
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We next correlated both types of memory errors with each of the PCL subscales, 
and—to focus more specifically on the role of intrusive memories—with EIS scores.5 
Table 2 presents the results. These data provide no conclusive evidence for a relationship 
between memory errors and symptoms. However, people who scored higher on the EIS 
made more boundary restriction errors (BREs; selecting either ‘slightly farther’ or ‘much 
farther’). Recall that the EIS captures information about the frequency of intrusions, and 
also the unpredictability, unwantedness, interference and distress associated with the 
experience of intrusions. The re-experiencing subscale of the PCL captures how much 
subjects were bothered by repeated intrusions, a sense of reliving, upsetting reminders, 
and physical reactions relating to the photographs. It is possible that these subtle 
differences between the scales (note that in this sample the correlation between them was 
r=.67 [-.55, .76]) could explain why the EIS—but not re-experiencing—is significantly 
associated with boundary errors in this experiment. Alternatively, the new method for 
assessing boundary errors in this experiment could explain the different pattern of results. 
We also cannot rule out the possibility that the relationships are merely spurious. Given 
the low rate of BREs overall, we next examined the subgroup of subjects (58) who did 
make one or more BRE. As shown in Table 2, subjects who made more BREs did not 
score significantly higher on the symptom subscales. However, this analysis is limited by 
sample size.  
Confidence 
As in Experiment 1, we calculated mean confidence classified by correct responses 
(“no change”) and the two different types of incorrect responses (farther and closer). Due 
to the small rate of BREs, we compared subjects’ confidence on “no change” and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Subjects’ scores on the CPQ-DD were positively correlated with all subscales of the PCL 
and the EIS (rs = .44-.59), but were not related to recognition memory. 
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“closer” (boundary extension error) responses. A paired t-test revealed that subjects were 
more confident in correct answers (M=3.68 [3.56, 3.81]) compared to incorrect (BRE) 
answers (M=3.43 [3.29, 3.57]), t(110)=3.74, p<.01, d=.37 [.17, .56]).  
Overall, our boundary error results were very similar to Safer et al. (1998), in that 
subjects were quite accurate in recognizing that the photographs at test had not changed 
from the encoding phase, and we again had a low rate of BREs. Of course, as Safer et al. 
suggest, some of the correct answers may actually represent people who were unsure and 
thus guessed ‘no change’. In other words, potential guesses were confounded with 
accurate responses in this experiment. In Experiment 3, we presented subjects with 
photographs at test that were either more close-up or wider-angled than what they saw at 
encoding. Hence, subjects could no longer be accurate simply by guessing no change. On 
the other hand, we did not want guess responses to count as genuine memory errors. 
Thus, in Experiment 3, we excluded ‘no change’ responses. If subjects extend the 
boundaries of a photograph, they should inaccurately judge a wide-angled distracter 
photograph as closer (boundary extension); if they restrict the boundaries of a 
photograph, they should inaccurately judge a close-up distracter as farther away 
(boundary restriction). Again, we were interested in the relationship between these 
judgements and subjects’ analogue symptoms relating to the photographs. 
 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 157 subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We excluded data from 9 
people who failed to accurately complete the instructional manipulation checks embedded 
within the study, 25 who did not conform to our procedure, 12 people who reported 
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technical issues and one who did not pass the practice task. Thus, our analyses focus on 
the remaining 110 subjects. Subjects were US residents, aged 21-68 (M= 33.72, SD = 
10.67). Approximately half (53.51%) were male and the majority identified their ethnicity 
as Caucasian (including White; 72.81%). Other subjects identified as African American 
(including Black; 6.14%), Hispanic (7.01%), Asian American (5.26%), Eastern European 
(2.63%), European (3.51%), or mixed ethnic origin (2.63%). Socioeconomic data were 
not collected. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 2, except for one critical 
alteration to the recognition test (see Figure 1). When a photograph was presented as 
close-up during the encoding phase, it was presented as wider-angled on the test. 
Similarly, when a photograph was presented as wider-angled during the encoding phase, 
it was presented as close-up on the test. Subjects received the same camera distance 
instructions, examples, practice items, camera distance and confidence rating scales as in 
Experiment 2. 
Results 
Emotional impact of photos 
As in the previous experiments, subjects experienced a decrease in positive mood 
(Time 1: M=27.46, 95% CI [25.78, 29.14]; Time 2: M=22.62 [21.07, 24.16]; t(109)=8.22, 
p<.01, d=.57 [.41, .72]) and an increase in negative mood (Time 1: M=12.04 [11.10, 
12.97]; Time 2: M=18.47 [16.96, 19.98]; t(109)=9.88, p<.01, d=.97 [.74, 1.20]) after 
viewing the photographs. They rated the photos as being very unpleasant (M=6.17 [5.92, 
6.41]), and distressing (M=4.74 [4.38, 5.09]). Subjects’ scores on the modified PCL were 
similar to those in Experiments 1 and 2, ranging from 13-70 (M=23.23 [21.40, 25.05]) 
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with Cronbach’s Alpha = .93. Subjects’ scores on the PCL were positive correlated with 
EIS scores, r(110)=.63 [.50, .73], p<.01. Again, subjects reported that they had paid close 
attention to the photographs: M=6.37 (SD=.86), Range 3-7. 
Memory accuracy 
Recall that half the photos were presented as close-up at encoding, but wide-angled at 
test. On average, subjects rated these photographs as much closer (7.89%), slightly closer 
(24.74%), no change (52.70%), slightly farther (11.96%) and much farther (2.70%). 
These data show that subjects were most likely to incorrectly remember the photographs 
as having had extended boundaries. Indeed, the majority of subjects (70%) were incorrect 
for all of these photographs. This finding fits with the previous results showing a general 
tendency toward boundary extension errors.  
We presented the other half of photographs as wide-angled at encoding and close-up at 
test. Subjects were likely to correctly recognize at test that these photographs were closer. 
More specifically, on average, subjects rated these photographs as much closer (40.00%), 
slightly closer (38.31%), no change (18.95%), slightly farther (2.21%) and much farther 
(0.49%). The rate of BREs (“farther” judgements) was similar to Experiment 2, though 
recall that we did not include “no change” judgements, which were technically inaccurate 
in this procedure. 
Analogue PTSD symptoms and memory accuracy 
Again, we first examined how affect influenced memory accuracy. There was no 
significant relationship between subjects’ baseline scores on either PANAS subscale with 
proportion of boundary extension errors (rPA=.05 [-.14, .24], p=.57; rNA=.01 [-.18, .20], 
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p=.95). or boundary restriction errors (rPA=.13 [-.06, .31], p=.19; rNA=.10 [-.09, .28], 
p=.29). 
To focus on the role of specific symptoms, as in Experiment 2, we calculated the 
relationship between BEEs, BREs and the PCL subscales and EIS.6 Table 3 presents 
these data. Subjects who made boundary restriction errors were also more likely to have 
had negative reactions to the photographs, across all the PCL subscales and the EIS.   
Confidence 
We calculated mean confidence classified by accuracy (correct vs. incorrect) and 
proximity of photographs at test relative to encoding (farther or closer). A 2 x 2 within 
subjects ANOVA—using subjects who had complete data for all four conditions 
(n=33)—revealed that subjects were more confident in correct answers (M=3.18, 95% CI 
[2.91, 3.46]) compared to incorrect answers (M=2.88, 95% CI [2.59, 3.17]), F(1, 
32)=11.19, p<.01, η2= .26 [.04, .47]). Subjects were also more confident in photographs 
that were closer, with the potential for boundary restriction (M=3.15, 95% CI [2.87, 
3.44]) compared to photographs that were farther away, with the potential for boundary 
extension (M=2.91 [2.62, 3.21]), F(1, 32)=4.84, p=.04, η2= .13 [.00, ..34]. The interaction 
between accuracy and proximity was not statistically significant, F(1, 32)=1.62, p=.21, 
η2= .04 [.00, .24]).  
To examine whether we would replicate our pattern of results, and to provide more 
stable estimates of the effect sizes involved, we conducted a further experiment using a 
larger sample. We also addressed the issue of whether some subjects may have looked 
away from the photographs during the encoding phase. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Again, subjects’ scores on the CPQ-DD were positively correlated with all subscales of the 
PCL and the EIS (rs = .29-.49), but were not related to recognition memory. 
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Experiment 4 
Method 
Subjects 
We recruited 502 subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We excluded data from 37 
people who failed to accurately complete the instructional manipulation checks embedded 
within the study, 90 who did not conform to our procedure, 10 people who reported 
technical issues and 18 who did not pass the practice task. Thus, our analyses focus on the 
remaining 347 subjects.7 Subjects were US residents, aged 18-74 (M= 36.79, SD = 
10.33). Approximately half (51.9%) were male and the majority identified their ethnicity 
as Caucasian (including White; 77.30%). Other subjects identified as African American 
(including Black; 8.62%), Hispanic (3.74%), Asian American (3.16%), European 
(2.88%), or mixed ethnic origin (2.88%). Socioeconomic data were not collected. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 3. However, at the end of 
the study, we told subjects “It is very important for our research that we use data only 
from people who followed directions exactly. We ask that you answer the following 
questions honestly to help us analyze our data. Your answers will not affect payment.” 
We then asked them: “Did you ever find yourself closing your eyes or looking away from 
the photos during the video?” Subjects who answered yes to this question were also 
asked: “For approximately how many photos do you estimate that you closed your eyes 
or looked away?” We next asked subjects: “Did you ever find yourself closing your eyes 
or looking away from the photos during the memory test?” Subjects who answered yes to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Note that despite a larger sample size, the percentage of subjects we retained (69%) is 
similar to the previous experiments: 72%, 68% and 70% respectively. 
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this question were also asked: “For approximately how many photos do you estimate that 
you closed your eyes or looked away?”  
Results 
Attention to photos 
Approximately 26.22% of our final sample reported that they closed their eyes or 
looked away at least once during the encoding phase. Of these subjects, the majority 
(63.73%) estimated looking away or closing their eyes for 10% or fewer of the photos 
we showed them, and around 7.69% indicated doing so for only one or two (less than 
5%) of the photos. A small proportion of subjects (7.69%) reported looking away 
from half or more of the photos. Approximately 15.85% of subjects reported that they 
looked away or closed their eyes at least once during the test. Of these, 13.46% 
reported that they looked away/closed their eyes for less than 5% of the photos; half 
said they did so for 10% or fewer of the photos; and 13.46% looked away from half or 
more of the photos. We compared subjects who looked away/closed eyes at either 
encoding or test, with subjects who did not, on measures of distress. These analyses 
showed that subjects who reported looking away were more distressed by the film 
(M=5.47, SD=1.66) and reported more analogue PTSD symptoms on the PCL scale 
(M=26.57, SD=9.51), than participants who did not report looking away [Distress: 
M=4.57, SD=1.86, t(344)=4.22, p<.01, d=.50 [.26, .73]; PCL: M=21.41, SD=8.16, 
t(345)=5.08, p<.01, d=.60 [.36, .84].!In the analyses that follow, we consider the data with 
and without subjects who reported closing their eyes or looking away during either the 
encoding or test phases (n=100). It is important to note, however, that excluding subjects 
who looked away is a conservative approach; to look away from the photo implies that 
they attended to the photo enough to recognize that they did not want to focus on the 
image. Indeed, some subjects specifically commented on this issue (e.g., “I would look at 
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them initially full on and then sometimes find myself looking at the same photo from my 
peripheral vision”).  
Emotional impact of photos 
As in the previous experiments, subjects experienced a decrease in positive mood 
(Time 1: M=29.01, 95% CI [28.08, 29.93]; Time 2: M=22.67 [21.88, 23.47]; 
t(346)=17.61, p<.01, d=.788) and an increase in negative mood (Time 1: M=11.72 [11.36, 
12.08]; Time 2: M=19.11 [18.25, 19.97]; t(346)=18.91, p<.01, d=1.18) after viewing the 
photographs. They rated the photos as being very unpleasant (M=6.06 [5.90, 6.21]), and 
distressing (M=4.83 [4.38, 5.09]). Subjects’ scores on the modified PCL were similar to 
those in the previous experiments, ranging from 13-59 (M=22.90 [21.96, 23.84]) with 
Cronbach’s Alpha = .91. Subjects’ scores on the PCL were positive correlated with EIS 
scores, r(347)=.69 [.63, .74], p<.01. Again, subjects reported that they had paid close 
attention to the photographs: M=6.36 (SD=.92), Range 2-7. 
Memory accuracy 
First, we considered photos presented as close-up at encoding, but wide-angled at test. 
On average, subjects rated these photographs as much closer (11.71%), slightly closer 
(30.78%), no change (53.78%), slightly farther (3.32%) and much farther (0.42%). These 
data show subjects were very likely to remember these photographs as having had 
extended boundaries. Again, the majority of subjects (64%) were incorrect for all of these 
photographs. Next, we considered photographs presented as wide-angled at encoding and 
close-up at test. Subjects were likely to correctly recognize at test that these photographs 
were closer. More specifically, on average, subjects rated these photographs as much 
closer (20.78%), slightly closer (35.82%), no change (40.31%), slightly farther (2.61%) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!We used ESCI software (Cumming, 2012) to calculate confidence intervals. However, CI 
calculation is not available for paired designs where the df exceeds 200.  
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and much farther (0.48%). These proportions are generally similar to Experiment 3, 
though subjects were more likely to judge closer photographs as the same. The 
proportions are also almost identical when subjects who reported closing their eyes or 
looking away are excluded (much closer (20.76%), slightly closer (36.03%), no change 
(40.40%), slightly farther (2.27%) and much farther (0.50%)). 
Analogue PTSD symptoms and memory accuracy 
We examined whether baseline differences in affect influenced memory accuracy. 
Here, higher positive affect was associated with a greater number of boundary extension 
errors (rPA=.16 [.06, .26], p<.01), but not with boundary restriction errors (rNA=-.04 [-.15, 
.07], p=.46). The opposite was true for negative affect: it was not associated with a greater 
number of boundary extension errors (rPA=-.03 [-.14, .08], p=.56), but people with 
heightened negative affect made more BREs (r=.16 [.06, .26], p<.01). These data are 
consistent when people who closed their eyes are excluded (r=.32 [.20, .43]). These 
results make sense if fewer boundary extension errors are seen as a type of boundary 
restriction. 
Table 3 presents the data relating to symptoms.9 As in Experiment 3, subjects who 
made boundary restriction errors were also more likely to have had negative reactions to 
the photographs across all subscales of the PCL. The relationship between BREs and 
intrusive experiences as measured by the EIS, appears less consistent. Importantly, the 
relationship between memory errors and analogue trauma symptoms remains when we 
remove subjects who reported looking away or closing their eyes during encoding or test 
from the analysis.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Again, subjects’ scores on the CPQ-DD were positively correlated with all subscales of the 
PCL and the EIS (rs = .35-.55). In this experiment subjects who reported more processing of 
the perceptual features of the photographs made more BREs (r=.15). 
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Confidence 
As in Experiment 3, we calculated mean confidence classified by accuracy (correct vs. 
incorrect) and proximity of photographs at test relative to encoding (farther or closer). A 2 
x 2 within subjects ANOVA—using subjects who had complete data for all four 
conditions (n=81)—revealed that subjects were more confident in correct answers 
compared to incorrect answers, but only when the errors were for photographs that were 
closer, with the potential for boundary restriction (Mcorrect=3.25, 95% CI [3.09, 3.42]; 
Mincorrect=2.94 [2.74, 3.14]). When the errors were for photographs that were farther away, 
with the potential for boundary extension, subjects were more confident in their incorrect 
answers (Mcorrect=2.91, 95% CI [2.75, 3.07]; Mincorrect=3.16 [3.00, 3.33]), F(1, 80)=17.26, 
p<.01, η2= .18 [.05, .32]). These data replicate the pattern from Experiment 3, with a 
larger sample size, which may have allowed us to detect a statistically significant 
interaction.  
 
General Discussion 
Our findings replicate earlier work on boundary errors for visual scenes (e.g., Intraub 
et al., 1992; Intraub & Bodaner, 1993; Intraub et al., 1996): across all four experiments, 
subjects were most likely to remember the photos as having more extended boundaries 
than they really had. This bias to remember the photos as having extended—as opposed 
to restricted—boundaries did not occur because the images were not sufficiently 
traumatic. Indeed, our subjects rated the images, on average, as extremely unpleasant, and 
reported a more negative mood state after viewing them.  
Importantly, although the rate of boundary restriction errors (BREs) was low overall, 
we found in the latter two experiments that individual differences in analogue symptoms 
predicted susceptibility to making these errors. This is our most important finding. If, as 
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we have argued, boundary restriction errors are analogous to misremembering an event as 
being “more traumatic,” then our results parallel findings from field studies showing that 
re-experiencing is associated with memory amplification. Indeed, the size of the effects 
we find in our data are comparable to effects from the field data, for example; .20, 95% 
CI [.16, .24] (Giosan et al., 2009); .23 [.06, .38] (Engelhard et al., 2008); .26 [.22, .30] 
(King et al, 2000);.32 [.17, .60] (Southwick et al., 1997).10 However, we also saw a 
relationship with other symptom clusters, particularly in Experiment 4 where we had the 
largest sample.  
Our findings therefore have important theoretical implications. The fact that re-
experiencing the images was associated with boundary restriction is consistent with the 
idea that boundary restriction errors occur due to a failure in source monitoring. There are 
several possible routes by which this failure could occur. One possibility, which we call 
the rehearsal-via-re-experiencing account, is that subjects tend to rehearse the worst—or 
most salient—part of the photographs via their re-experiencing symptoms. Therefore, it is 
these salient or central parts of the traumatic images that are most likely to be amplified, 
leading subjects to remember a closer version of the photographs. However, BREs were 
also associated with other symptom clusters, not only re-experiencing symptoms. A 
second, but not mutually exclusive, possibility is that symptoms increase the arousal 
associated with the photographs, and thus enhance subjects’ perception of the level of 
threat associated with the events depicted in the photographs. This possibility aligns with 
Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model. According to Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive 
model, PTSD becomes a persistent disorder when people process the trauma in a way that 
leads to a sense of serious, current threat.  Once activated, the perception of threat is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 We used ESCI software (Cumming, 2013) to estimate 95% confidence intervals for 
these effects. 
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accompanied by re-experiencing symptoms, such as intrusive thoughts, nightmares and 
flashbacks, in addition to arousal and anxiety. Our data appear to fit with the idea that 
people who reported more symptoms, and therefore processed the trauma in a way that is 
thought to lead to a sense of current threat, also had a tendency to misremember the 
photos as being closer. In other words, they showed a bias to remember the event as being 
more threatening than it actually was. Finally, our data are consistent with the broaden-
and-build theory of positive emotions, which also predicts that negative emotions result 
in more attention to the threatening components of an event. 
There are, of course, other possible explanations for our findings. First, the 
unpredictable nature of boundary restriction errors could be a result of individual 
differences. For example, we know that people prone to anxiety are more likely to rapidly 
and selectively attend to and encode emotionally threatening words or pictures 
(Derryberry & Reed, 1998; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). This 
idea could also explain why we found that avoidance predicted susceptibility to boundary 
restriction in some of our data: people who are more prone to anxiety may also be more 
motivated to avoid thinking about the trauma. However, we also saw a relationship 
between avoidance and BE errors in Experiment 3. This correlation may have resulted 
from subjects avoiding the stimuli altogether—for example, by looking away—and hence 
making more errors in general, a possibility we addressed in Experiment 4.   
A second alternative explanation for our results is that people are motivated to justify 
their level of distress and apparent symptomatology (Bolton et al., 2006; Engelhard et al., 
2008; King et al., 2000; Southwick et al., 1997). Indeed, a number of researchers have 
speculated that the memory amplification effect may be the result of a reappraisal 
process, whereby people who are suffering from current problems are motivated to 
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attribute those problems to stressors from the trauma (Bolton et al., 2006; Engelhard et 
al., 2008; King et al., 2000; Southwick et al., 1997). Perhaps then, the relationship we 
observed between the different symptom clusters and boundary restriction errors is 
simply the result of differences in motivation to justify distress. The relationship with re-
experiencing symptoms may be the most consistent because re-experiencing the event is 
arguably one of the more distressing reactions to a traumatic event and may be more 
readily considered to have a negative idiosyncratic meaning (e.g, ‘I am going crazy’) 
compared to other symptom clusters, such as avoidance or numbing. Hence, people with 
more frequent re-experiencing may be more motivated to justify their level of distress and 
as such infer that they were closer to the traumatic elements of the images during 
encoding.  
Of course, our study has several limitations. Our design is correlational, which means 
we cannot determine causality or the directionality of the relationship between memory 
amplification and analogue symptoms.  Furthermore, we are unable to compare the 
pattern of effects relating to negative images, to a comparable group of neutral images. 
We also assessed intrusive memories—and other analogue PTSD symptoms—20 min 
after exposure to the photos. One could argue, therefore, that, our measure of intrusive 
memories may not be an appropriate analogue for intrusive memories in PTSD, 
especially because memory for the trauma is still being consolidated during this time. 
However, a number of studies have assessed intrusions using short monitoring periods 
immediately following analogue trauma exposure (e.g., Davies & Clark, 1998, Horowitz 
& Becker, 1971; Nixon, Cain, Nehmy & Seymour, 2009a; 2009b). Indeed, Davies and 
Clark (1998) found that the frequency of immediate intrusions was significantly 
correlated with the frequency of intrusions experienced over the following week. Thus, 
we argue that our measure of intrusions provides an appropriate analogue for intrusions in 
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the laboratory setting. Finally, however, our paradigm is of course artificial due to the 
constraints of examining trauma in the laboratory. Thus, the generalizability of our 
findings to clinical populations may be limited.  Nevertheless, our paradigm provides a 
necessarily practical and ethical methodology to investigate boundary restriction and 
memory amplification. Indeed, prior research has shown that the IAPS photos elicit 
consistent fear-related physiological and behavioral responses (Hairi, Tessitore, Mattay, 
& Weinberger, 2002; Smith, Bradley, & Lang, 2005). 
Several important future research directions arise from our data. Although our data are 
consistent with the idea that boundary restriction errors occur due to a failure in source 
monitoring, we are not able to draw any firm conclusions about the specific mechanism. 
We would argue that disentangling the mechanisms involved is therefore a high research 
priority. We have suggested that BREs may occur because people rehearse the worst parts 
of their experience and it is this re-experiencing of the trauma via rehearsal that biases 
memory for proximity. This process is distinct from one in which people justify existing 
distress and thus experience memory distortion. Although both processes may be at work, 
teasing out the mechanisms involved in the relationship between symptomatology and 
boundary restriction errors may be important for psychological treatment. In other words, 
to determine the best ways to treat maladaptive reactions to trauma, we must know to what 
extent memory (in)accuracy plays a role. One possibility is that reliving and rehearsing the 
salient aspects of trauma worsens symptoms via memory distortion. 
In order to more closely examine the underlying mechanisms we have discussed, it 
would be critical to examine what happens between encoding and retrieval. A longer 
delay would make it possible to measure intrusion frequency, content and characteristics 
(such as distress), for example by having subjects complete a thought diary (Davies & 
Clark, 1998). If subjects who had more intrusions about the central, traumatic, aspects of 
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the photographs also had more boundary restriction errors than subjects who did not think 
about the photos as much, it might suggest that rehearsal—over time—of the salient parts 
of the photographs, is responsible for the amplification effect.  
The second area of future research that would advance understanding in this area and 
allow us to make firmer links to theory concerns whether subjects’ arousal and sense of 
threat relating to the trauma at the time of encoding leads to memory distortion, and 
whether changes in threat perceptions over time are associated with symptoms. A study 
addressing these questions could also assess whether individual differences in trait 
anxiety affect boundary restriction errors. 
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Figure 1. Encoding and Test Procedure (Experiments 2-4)  
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Table 1. 
Correlations (and 95% CIs) between d’ and c scores and the PCL subscales (Experiment 
1). 
  Subscale   
 Re-experiencing Avoidance Numbness Hyperarousal 
d’ 
-.16 [-.34, .03] -.13 [-.31, .06] -.21* [-.38, -.03] -.15 [-.33, .04] 
c .20* [.02, .37] .20* [.02, .37] .12 [-.07, .30] .09 [-.10, .27] 
Note: *p<.05 
